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1 Introduction
The dispute in Santam Limited v Dial Direct Limited and Joe Public (Pty)
Ltd (unreported Western Cape High Court case number 13278/11),
ended via a settlement, and judgment was given without any reasons
being provided. Nevertheless, the facts raise a number of interesting
questions, some of which are considered below. The facts were that
Santam had a television advertisement produced (described in the court
papers as “the Real McCoy” – available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5JJWdpKATP0 (accessed 2011-12-10)). Sir Ben Kingsley is
shown walking on the beach, talking about how consumers should
discern between insurance companies, and in the end four look-alike
men are shown. Dial Direct, a competitor of Santam, produced a
commercial in response (available at http://www.alonberman.com/dial-
directs-take-on-sanlams-ben-kingsley-ad (accessed 2011-12-10)). This
commercial depicted an entity with a hand as the upper “body”, walking
on a beach, saying “yada yada”’, and at the end four similar entities
appear. The words “less yada yada, more ching ching” then appear on
the screen. In the applicant’s founding affidavit the similarities were said
to be, more in particular, that both advertisements had the same
backdrop; the “persons” involved had the same dress style; the
composition, grading and camera angles of the shots in the adverts are
virtually identical; and similar music and lighting is used to create the
same mood (par 24).
Santam brought an urgent application for relief on the following bases.
Firstly, that the copyright in the Real McCoy advertisement, said to be a
cinematograph film (“film”), was infringed by the production of the Yada
Yada advertisement. Secondly, that the Dial Direct advertisement
amounted to disparagement. Relief on both grounds was granted and an
interim order made on 4 July 2011. The focus of this discussion is the
application of the facts to the provisions of the Copyright Act (98 of
1978), as well as those of the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)
(available at http://www.asasa.org.za/ (accessed 2011-12-19)).
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2 1 Protecting the Real McCoy Commercial qua 
Cinematograph Film
The basis of the court’s order in this regard was the definition of
“cinematograph film” in section 1 of the Copyright Act, as well as section
8 (exclusive rights) read with section 23(1) (primary infringement
through the performance of an exclusive activity). Of specific interest is
section 8(1)(a), which renders the reproduction of a film an act of
infringement. Was the Real McCoy commercial reproduced however?
Can one, a priori, reproduce a film except by mechanical means? What
is the position where no physical copying takes place, but film B is, in all
material respects, hardly distinguishable, for want of a better term, from
film A, that was created earlier? Does this still amount to copying? It is
possible, on the one hand, to focus on the result of an action, not the
nature thereof. One can take as an example the situation where a poem
is not copied mechanically, by way of a photocopy machine for instance,
but reproduced by writing it down. The copyright is still being infringed,
even though the particular format (material form to which it was
reduced) such as a book, was not physically copied. It is the work that is
being copied (Norowzian v Arks Ltd [1998] FSR 394 398). The mere
recitation of a poem might even, arguably, be seen as a “reproduction”
(definition of “performance” in s 1(1) read with s 6(1)(c) Copyright Act) .
One can also discern, on the other hand, a work such as a sound
recording, which of course consists of one or two underlying works,
namely a literary and/or musical work. The crisp question is whether the
reproduction of the sound recording by non-mechanical means would
amount to infringement? A performance with a different singer might
perhaps not amount to the reproduction of the recording. What about the
situation though where, for argument’s sake, all performers involved in
the original recording “reproduce” the original recording, in every aural
facet, in a new recording? One must bear in mind that a sound recording
has a separate existence from its constituent musical and literary works,
and that copyright can exist simultaneously in a literary work and a
sound recording (Van der Merwe (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in
South Africa (2011) 157). Can infringement thus take place?
This issue came to the fore in the Australian decision in CBS Records
Australia Ltd v Telmak Teleproducts (Aust)(Pty) Ltd (9 IPR 440). It was
alleged that, apart from the lyrics and music, a “substantial number of
the sounds” embodied in the original soundtracks were copied, in other
words, it was a “sound alike”. Section 85(a) of the Australian Copyright
Act (of 1968) provided that copyright in relation to a sound recording
involves the exclusive right to copy the recording. Section 10(3)(c)
determines that “a reference to a copy of a sound recording shall be read
as a reference to a record embodying a sound recording or a substantial
part of a sound recording being a record derived directly or indirectly
from a record produced upon the making of a sound recording”. It was
held that the said provision “is referring to an actual embodiment of the
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Also, in the context of the replacement of a lost or stolen recording “[t]he
right given to make a copy, notwithstanding the existence of copyright,
for the purpose of replacing that sound recording in the collection must
refer to a copy of the actual sounds embodied in the original sound
recording and not to something produced later by other performers by
way of imitation of the original” (444). In the course of its judgment, the
court also referred to the position in the United States (444). Section
114(b) of the American Copyright Act (of 1976) deals with the rights of
the owner of the copyright subsisting in a sound recording, and
determines, amongst others, the following:
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication
of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the
copyrighted sound recording.
That the above reasoning may apply to films , appears from the British
Norowzian decision (supra). Here it was alleged that the defendant’s film
was purposely made to resemble the plaintiff’s film, a “reshoot”
containing all the essential features. It was held that it is only the copying
of the film itself which would amount to infringement (400). This
approach seems applicable to section 8(1)(a) of the South African
Copyright Act. It would follow that a non-physical “copy” would also not
infringe the right to make an adaptation of the film (s 8(1)(e) Copyright
Act). Yet another implication of this approach might apply to section
8(1)(a) of the Act, which also grants the copyright holder the exclusive
right to make a still photograph from the film. It seems that having regard
to the physical connotation a film has in an infringement context, it
would not amount to infringement to paint an exact copy of a still
photograph of a film. The physical copying of the photo would however
infringe the copyright in the film. In summary of the above discussion, it
appears that infringement of the copyright in the film was an incorrect
basis for the court’s finding in the Santam case (supra).
2 2 Protecting the Real McCoy qua Literary Work
An alternative basis for relief might be the infringement of a literary
work, the script of the Real McCoy advertisement being a
“cinematograph film scenario” (definition of “literary work” in s 1(1))
Copyright Act). In relation to the requirement of “originality” in section
2(1) of the Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that creativity is
not required, only that a work must not have been copied from an
existing source, and its production must have involved a substantial (or
not trivial) degree of skill, judgment or labour (Haupt t/a Soft Copy v
Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) par 35).
The script can probably amount to a few paragraphs, and, in light of the
approach of the Haupt case (supra), would with ease qualify as a literary
work. As alluded to above, any copying of a literary work, by handwriting
or mechanically, would amount to infringement. This did not occur in the
Santam case (supra). What is the position thus? One does not have to
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a literary work as the exclusive right of the copyright owner. There
already exists a specific provision. In so far as the exclusive right to
reproduce is concerned, the Act namely determines that “reproduction”,
in relation to a literary work includes a reproduction in the form of a
record or a cinematograph film. Accordingly, in a formal sense, the
reproduction of the script could amount to infringement. However, it
goes without saying that all literary works are not equal, so to speak. One
can compare the modest script that resulted in the Real McCoy “film”, a
film with a duration of two minutes and six seconds, with the script of a
full-length film of, say, two hours. Similarly, one can envisage a script of
only a few pages by renowned filmmaker Quentin Tarantino, also
resulting in a film of only two minutes, but containing vivid and varied
scenarios. The unavoidable conclusion is that there are levels of
creativity. Whilst the Act may disregard literary quality as far as the
subsistence of copyright is concerned (s 1(1) Copyright Act), one must
contemplate the possibility that the level of “originality” of a script may
not always cast a shadow long enough to indicate infringement. In
contrast, the physical copying of merely a part of a film, even though
based on a script with a low level of originality, could amount to
infringement of the copyright in the film. By way of example, film B is a
mechanical copy of film A, which simply depicts a boy kicking a ball.
Such copying would amount to infringement of the copyright in film A,
but the two or three sentence script resulting in film A, whilst still perhaps
an “original” literary work, will not have the gravitas to found a claim of
infringement when this (literary) work is compared to film B. The nature
of a work is thus important.
To develop the above proposition further, it can be noted that in cases
of alleged infringement, it is necessary to prove that the first and second
works, or substantial parts thereof, are the same or similar, and that B
copied A’s work. When comparing the two relevant works for purposes
of determining infringement, one must consider the parts of the
plaintiff’s work which are original (Dean Handbook of South African
Copyright Law (1987) 1-38). This was stated by said author by drawing
an analogy with the test found in trade mark law, namely whether the
respective trade marks are confusingly similar (see s 34(1) Trade Marks
Act 194 of 1993). An interesting question that arises is whether one
cannot perhaps expand the analogy further? All registered marks are not
treated equally. Notably, ordinary trademarks enjoy protection in
relation to use on the same or similar goods or services (section 34(1)(a)-
(b) Trade Marks Act). However, well-known or, rather, famous marks,
enjoy protection against use in relation to any goods or services (section
34(1)(c) Trade Marks Act). The explanation is simply that famous marks
have a greater amount of commercial magnetism. Similarly, various
copyrighted works which all meet the originality requirement on a
minimum level, can, factually, have different degrees of originality. 
It is useful here to have regard to the decision in Preformed Line
Products (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Hardware Assemblies (Pty) Ltd (202 JOC (N)).
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original, the copyright will not be infringed unless a substantial part is
used. Furthermore, substantiality relates, principally, to the quality of
what is taken, specifically, its degree of originality. Therefore, when the
ideas which have been copied are of an insubstantial or hackneyed
character, even taken collectively, there will be no infringement (215H).
Applying the above to the Real McCoy script, it appears that one may
argue that the level of originality might be so low that its copying through
the Yada Yada film would not amount to infringement. There is, indeed,
a causal connection between the Real McCoy script and the Yada Yada
film, but a substantial part (as described above) was not copied, only the
idea embodied in the former. 
3 The ASA Code
It is interesting to speculate as to what the position would have been if
Santam lodged a complaint with the Advertising Standards Authority
(ASA), instead of approaching the High Court? The following rules might
apply.
3 1 Clause 6 (Disparagement) Clause 6 Provides as Follows:
6.1 Advertisements should not attack, discredit or disparage other products,
services, advertisers or advertisements directly or indirectly.
A point of reference might be the decision of the ASA Appeal Committee
in Kentucky Fried Chicken International Holdings v Golden Fried Chicken
(Pty) Limited, t/a Chicken Licken (2009-03-02). Here a competitor
showed, amongst others, characters having features similar to the well-
known Colonel Sanders image, criticising the complainant’s products on
the basis that they are boring. The conclusion reached by the ASA was
that the advertisement “diminishes and devalues” the well-established
Kentucky Fried Chicken brand. Chicken Licken relied on its
advertisement being a parody, with reference to the decision in Laugh It
Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark
International and Another 2006 1 SA 144 (CC). This defence was
however rejected as “... the right of Chicken Licken to freedom of
expression must give way to its obligation not to advertise in a manner
which would discredit or be disparaging of its major competitor’s product
or advertisements.”
The Yada Yada advertisement implies that the commercial of Santam
contains nonsense, which amounts to disparagement. An allegation of
racial exploitation would also seem to do so. But in the Laugh It Off ruling
(supra) a robust view was followed and it was noted by Sachs J that
“There is no proof whatsoever that imputations of racist labour practices
in the past by SAB would in any way affect the eagerness of present day
customers to down another glass of Carling Black Label.” (par 98). To be
read with this dictum, is the important statement by Moseneke J that “It
is appropriate to observe that the mere fact that the expressive act may
indeed stir discomfort in some and appear to be morally reprobate or
unsavoury to others is not ordinarily indicative of a breach of s 34(1)(c).”
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picture that emerges for a litigant finding itself in the position of Santam
is, accordingly, bleak. The position seems to be that a “mere” insulting
advertisement would simply have to be tolerated. Where will the line be
drawn though? One possibility might be the requirement of “substantial
economic detriment” (Laugh It Off case (supra) par 56). To be sure, the
principle laid down by the case is that a “negative” connotation with a
mark is permitted, unless the owner can prove substantial economic
harm. The question that arises now is to what extent this finding can be
applied to clause 6? Is disparagement in itself enough? Can guidance be
obtained from the Trade Marks Act? Infringement in terms of section
34(1)(a)-(b) of the Act, in contrast to section 34(1)(c), does not require
proof of detriment (disparaging use of a mark will not easily fall within
the scope of these provisions though, as such use will mostly differentiate
the respective marks). The above dictum from the Laugh It Off case
(supra) thus cannot represent the whole spectrum of trade mark
infringement, only that envisaged in section 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks
Act. The Trade Marks Act accordingly does not take the matter further.
Can guidance be obtained from the common law? The position also
seems to be that “mere” disparagement is not enough, there must be a
probability of loss (Van Heerden-Neethling Unlawful Competition (2008)
276). What is the solution therefore? It must be borne in mind that the
ASA Code is a contract, containing rules to which the participants agreed.
Consequently, “mere” disparagement might be sufficient for a
contravention of clause 6, even in the absence of substantial economic
detriment or probable damage to the advertising function of a trade
mark. However, as mentioned by Neethling (319), if a ground of
justification is present a business may be disparaged (or defamed) under
the banner of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. The
obvious ground of justification, in the context of the Santam case (supra),
is parody. This aspect is discussed below. 
3 2 Clause 8 (Exploitation of Advertising Goodwill)
Clause 8 reads as follows:
8.1 Advertisements may not take advantage of the advertising goodwill
relating to the trade name or symbol of the product or service of another, or
advertising goodwill relating to another party’s advertising campaign or
advertising property, unless the prior written permission of the proprietor of
the advertising goodwill has been obtained…
8.2 Parodies, the intention of which is primarily to amuse and which are
not likely to affect adversely the advertising goodwill of another advertiser to
a material extent, will not be regarded as falling within the prohibition of
paragraph 8.1 above.
It can be assumed that there will be goodwill attached to the advertising
campaign of Santam. The inevitable question is that of the meaning of
clause 8.2? The parody defence contained in clause 8.2 can be seen in
two contexts. Firstly, the phrase “which are not likely to affect adversely
the advertising goodwill of another advertiser to a material extent” is
reminiscent of section 107(4) of the American Copyright Act. Section
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follows:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work … is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) …
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The United States Supreme Court earlier held that the fourth factor was
the most important (Harper & Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises 471
US 539 (1985) 566). However, in the leading case of Campbell v Acuff-
Rose Music Inc (510 US 569 (1994) 578) the court followed the approach
that the four factors must not be considered in isolation, but all must be
explored, and the results weighed together, in the light of the purposes
of copyright law. In the conventional situation, a copyrighted work is an
end in itself. The specific item, a book for instance, is being traded in, it
is made available to members of the public. Sales can fluctuate, and the
process of determining market harm is relatively easier than is the case
with the Real McCoy script. It is a once-off product, a commodity not
circulated in the market. On a narrow interpretation, there can thus be
no market harm. Should one always separate a work from the medium
in which it is embodied though? A broader interpretation of the issue of
market harm could lead one to the conclusion that the Yada Yada
commercial would basically erode the effectiveness of the Real McCoy
advertisement. After all, the impact of the Real McCoy commercial is
diminished and its message diluted, however, there is no market harm
to the script, there is no reasonable potential for it to become
commercially valuable outside the relationship between the author of the
script and Santam. It seems real however to recognise the fact that the
continued flighting of the Yada Yada commercial would have neutralised
the Real McCoy advertisement to a large extent, jeopardising Santam’s
investment in the advertisement, which amounted, according to the
founding papers, to R25 million (par 12.6). This figure cannot be laughed
off. Of relevance is section 107(4) of the American Copyright Act that
mentions “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.” In summary, if the ASA considered the latter
argument, it should have rejected the parody defence. 
Guidance may also be found, secondly, in the Laugh It Off decision
(supra). One consideration is that the fact that the particular use is offered
as humour does not automatically render it immune from restraint (par
81). Of more significance, it was said, is whether the activity is primarily
communicative in character or primarily commercial (par 86). Adopting
the position that Dial Direct’s expressive activity was primarily
commercial, and that humour does not automatically provide a defence,
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Incidentally, it was said in the Campbell ruling (supra) (585) that “The use
... of a copyrighted work to advertise a product ... will be entitled to less
indulgence …”.
3 3 Rule 9 (Imitation of an Advertisement)
Rule 9 reads as follows:
9.1 An advertiser should not copy an existing advertisement, local or
international, or any part thereof in a manner that is recognisable or clearly
evokes the existing concept and which may result in the likely loss of
potential advertising value. This will apply notwithstanding the fact that there
is no likelihood of confusion or deception or that the existing concept has not
been generally exposed.
The mere fact that the “new” advertisement evokes the existing one is
not sufficient to obtain relief. For example, in the Campbell case (supra)
it was said (588-589) that even the use of “the heart” of a work could be
protected under parody. Also, in the Laugh It Off ruling (supra), Sachs J
stated that the fact that the trademark image is central to the parody does
not make it automatically or even presumptively liable for restraint (par
81). One is thus in a position where, to decide the issue, the aspect of
“harm” must be considered. It seems reasonable to accept that there will
be a “likely loss of potential advertising value”, not only because the
central theme of the Real McCoy advertisement was copied, but also that
the Yada Yada commercial effectively erases, alternatively dilutes the
message of the Real McCoy advertisement. Accordingly, the parody
defence should also not apply in the context of clause 9. 
4 Unlawful Competition
A full discussion of the above falls outside the scope of this note. Suffice
it to say, as indicated above, and accepting the summation of the legal
position by Neethling (319), that it appears that if a ground of justification
is present a business may be disparaged (or defamed) as the other party
may rely on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
5 Conclusion
The Santam judgment (supra) is incorrect as far as the copyright
infringement aspect is concerned. It is possible that copyright would
subsist in the script of the Real McCoy advertisement, but that the level
of creativity would probably not have been sufficient to found a claim for
copyright infringement. The Dial Direct commercial could notionally lie
within the scope of various clauses of the ASA Code. However, the impact
of the Laugh It Off ruling (supra) makes the expression of a final view
thereon problematic. 
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